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INTRODUCTION
The benefits of inflation targeting in the Svensson (1999) sense amount to providing a nominal anchor for the private sector with which to infer policies with greater precision and therefore formulate expectations with greater accuracy. For the Central Bank (CB) on the other hand, inflation targeting provides an implicit commitment mechanism which increases its cost of deviating from the announced target and hence discourages it from doing so. Inflation targeting is associated with greater transparency therefore, which in itself provides greater credibility and effective monetary policies. From a political economy standpoint inflation targeting is desirable since society gains from a central bank that is forthcoming in its intentions. However, it is not unequivocal that transparent regimes offer immediate credibility for monetary policy. 'It appears that for monetary policy makers, announcements alone are not enough; the only way to gain credibility is to earn it'. (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997) . Moreover, inflation targeting is neither neccessary nor sufficient for effective monetary policies. Indeed, credible policies do not necessitate transparency! It is in the absence of credibility, that transparency becomes an issue.
Furthermore, in the presence of uncertainty full tranparency (in the inflation targeting sense) by itself is not sufficient to achieve credible outcomes (Dillén and Nilsson,1998) . It is this point that we examine in this paper.
We argue that operating in an uncertain environment (captured by uncertainty in the transmission processes) redefines the concept of transparency and compels instead a more effective communication of the balance of risks. It is this which in combination with the track record of meeting one's objectives over a sustained period of time, eventually establishes the credibility of the Central Bank 1 . We will argue that acknowledging the presence of uncertainty implies that by aiming at an optimally defined range around the inflation target, we maximise the likelihood of actually hitting it.
Similarly to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) therefore, we view inflation targeting no so much as a rule per se, but as a framework for monetary policy within which 'constrained discretion' can be exercised.
In fact that is not contrary to the experience of countries that have operated an inflation target which were unable at times to sacrifice important elements of flexibility to achieve maximum transparency (Bernanke et al, 1999 , with reference to the Riksbank). There remains however an important question. It is perhaps understandable that the Central Bank would be keen to reduce the overall level of transparency. Svensson (1999) argues that this allows it to pursue its objectives without threatening its reputation. The issue that arises however, is why would the public ever allow for less clearly defined monetary objectives and hence agree to receiving less information 2 . Our justification stems from the presence of uncertainty. As argued above, what the public cares about is credible policies and ultimately effective monetary performance sustained over time. Uncertainty by definition makes the effects of monetary policy harder to predict.
But announcing a target that is unlikely to be achieved is not necessarily increasing one's credibility.
Instead, we argue that if one allows for a certain degree of flexibility in the objective, (when events warrant it) and manipulates it in a transparent way (i.e. operating still in an optimising framework), then society improves its welfare. If the public views it this way, then it is possible to consent to a what appears to be less than fully transparent regime.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model used and presents our benchmark case of no uncertainty. Section 3 then introduces uncertainty as defined by Brainard (1967) and shows the effects on the objectives and the use of the interest rate instrument. We expand this analysis in section 4 by introducing flexibility in the instrument in an optimal way. Section 5 discusses the effects of such an operating mechanism on credibility. Section 6 concludes.
The model is a simple reduced form of a demand-supply system described as follows:
with a > 0
where (1) represents a demand equation, in which deviation of inflation from equilibrium is a function of the interest rate 3 and (2) is a traditional expectations augmented Phillips curve. The two terms ε and η represent a demand and supply shock respectively and independently normally distributed variables with
The monetary authority uses the interest rate to minimise a loss function expressed in terms of deviations of inflation and output from their respective targets.
The loss function (3) shows that the Central Bank follows a flexible inflation targeting rule, as defined by Svennson (1999) . For simplicity, we have assumed equal weights in the two objectives. In the absence of any other policy agent in the economy, the Central Bank's objectives are identified with those of the median voter such that the objectives of both are achieved simultaneously.
The timing of the game is as follows: the private sector forms its expectations about future inflation on which it bases wage negotiations. Wage setters move first and fix wages according to those expectations such that w = π e . A shock occurs next to which the CB reacts by choosing an appropriate interest rate that optimises the conditional expectations of its loss function. In a rational expectations world, the discretionary outcome occurs. We assume that the Central Bank and the private agents share identical information. In an uncertain world, this implies that the perceptions of uncertainty are the same for both.
The only difference that occurs therefore (given the timing of the game) is that private agents have no knowledge of the shock whereas the CB reacts to it in full knowledge of its extent.
We investigate thus three scenarios:
Case 1 Inflation Targeting with Additive Uncertainty
This case constitutes our benchmark to compare against the scenarios with uncertainty. This is the standard case of additive uncertainty coming from supply and demand shocks, unknown to the public, which the CB needs to react to.
Case 2 Inflation Targeting with Multiplicative Parameter Uncertainty
Next we analyse a simple form of parameter uncertainty. We apply the simple multiplicative form of uncertainty applied by Brainard(1967) which appears in the transmission process of monetary policy.
The Central Bank reacts to shocks therefore, not knowing with certainty what the real effects of its policy on the economy will be. Both the private agents and the Central Bank share the same information of what form this uncertainty takes.
Case 3 Inflation Targeting with Parameter and Target Uncertainty
In this final case, we analyse whether structural uncertainty can be handled better with the use of vriable inflation targeting. The Central Bank announces a target that it will want the inflation to achieve on average and not necessarily at all times. This constitutes therefore more of a declaration of intend rather than a concrete period by period strategy objective. In the short run therefore, the CB has the opportunity to deviate from its announcement in an optimal way (as we will show) given the shock, and therefore counteract the negative effect of parameter uncertainty.
Inflation Targeting with Certainty
Full certainty in the policies implies the first two unconditional moments of the distribution of inflation are E(π) = −ai and var (π) = σ 2 ε . Maximising (3) subject to (1) and (2) we obtain the familiar monetary policy reaction function:
and inflation
Expected inflation is thus equal to the target:
The model illustrates the efficiency of inflation targeting in a situation of complete certainty (minus shocks). Note also that monetary policy in this context is able to counteract demand shocks in their entirety but only partially offset supply shocks. The Certainty Equivalence (CE) results are therefore:
The Central Bank is therefore able to obtain the first best. Next we add multiplicative uncertainty on the parameter a and examine how the optimal behaviour of the central bank alters.
The issue or uncertainty in the making of economic policy has been, and remains still, a problem of vital importance. In his seminal paper of 1967, Brainard attmepts to tackle to problems associated with multiplicative uncertainty, in order words uncertainty in the transmission of policies. We attempt to proceed here in a similar fashion as Brainard, by introducing uncertainty in parameter a in equation (1).
Thus, the CB has only limited knowledge of the effects of its policies, as parameter a is stochastic in nature drawn from the following distribution:
For simplicity, we assume that a is independent of the two shocks. This time, the first two unconditional moments of the distribution of inflation are E(π) = −ai and var (π) = i 2 σ 2 a + σ 2 ε . We assume also that its coefficient of variation σ a a is sufficiently small to reduce the likelihood of having negative values for variable a. Given the stochastic nature of the policy problem, the CB formulates its policies based on the expected structure of the economy 4 . Formally it will be minimising the expected value of L.
conditional on the shocks that have occurred, i.e:
We define an increase in structural uncertainty as an increase in the variance σ 2 a . Note how there is no σ 2 ε in the objective function since the CB applies an optimal rule to a given shock ε and/or η. The conditional two first moments are given now by 13 and (14) E(π | ε,η ) = −ai + ε
and
The loss function in (12) can be rewritten as:
Optimising (15) with respect to i gives the following policy reaction function:
and the following level of inflation, given private sector expectations:
Taking rational expectations of (17) and simplifying we have:
Substituting (18) 5 in (16) and (17) gives us the optimal equilibrium values for the interest rate, inflation and output consistent with rational expectations: 
As the table above demonstrates, increasing uncertainty confirms Brainard's observations on optimal monetary policy. In particular, the presence of uncertainty has the following effects:
-The use of the instrument is constrained. In Brainard's terminology, the policy maker becomes naturally more cautious and at the limit abandons it altogether.(i.e. lim σ 2 a −→∞ i = 0). -(The inflation target itself becomes less important in the formulation of expectations about future inflation. The private sector therefore acknowledges the decreasing likelihood of the Central Bank to achieve it and considers it less, depending on what this uncertainty is. At the same time this implies that on average inflation will never reach its target.) monetary policy is unable to insulate the real side from demand shocks.
It is obvious that the presence of uncertainty reduces the efficiency of policy making, irrespective of the policy rule followed. Policy therefore is moved away from its first best. What we ask next therefore, is whether there exists a policy rule which improves the performances of our simple system, both from the point of view of the Bank but also from the point of view of the private sector as well. The next section is dedicated to this goal.
As demonstrated in the previous section, the introduction of uncertainty inevitably lessens the degree of effectiveness of monetary policy. At the limit, the Central Bank looses totally the use of its instrument.
The question that arises therefore is whether we can reintroduce the use of the interest rate, and whether doing so produces an unequivocal improvement in the effectiveness of monetary policy. Looking at the way inflation expectations are formed (18), we observe that the inflation target itself diminishes in importance as the degree of uncertainty increases. The private sector therefore, pays less and less attention to what the announcement of the central bank is when it knows that the environment it will operate in is uncertain. Following from this, we choose to de-emphasise the role of the explicit inflation target π * and we do so by introducing an implicit target (π * + θ) 6 , θ being the implicit component subject to discretionary change still to be determined. θ acquires therefore, the role of a choice variable and π * assumes now the role of a declaration of intent or deep target. Analogously, the expected value of the objective function is now captured by
or the conditional expectation:
The CB implicitly optimises:
such that the timing of the game is described as follows:
The algorithm thus solves the optimisation problems in two steps (backwards). Optimising (23) with respect to i gives the following policy reaction function:
and the following level of inflation, for given private sector expectations:
Taking expectations of (25) and simplifying we have: To maximise the probability of hitting the explicit target as in the loss function whereθ is the average departure from the target anticipated by the private sector. As we will show further down this is always positive, a feature specific to our model since inflationary expectations achieved under Brainard uncertainty fall always short of π * 7 . So far the results are similar to those arrived at in section 3 but with π * replaced by π * + θ (andθ in the case of π e ). Solving for Rational Expectations, the interest rate, inflation and output look as follows:
The above three equations represent now the rational expectations solutions when, operating under uncertainty, the bank has an implicit target (captured by θ). However, at the same time, the bank wishes to optimise its original loss function because it is that that represents its true objectives. The loss function is therefore,
substituting (28a) and (29) for π and y respectively. The resulting function is
The objective of the CB is to find the optimal inflation target, contingent on the shock hitting the economy and the perceived uncertainty of the transmission of policies. Formally the derivative of (31) with respect to θ will give an optimal deviation from the inflation target π * , captured by
which in its analytical form is
And the expected value of θ,(i.e.θ or E(θ)), is equal to
Substitutingθ into (33) gives a solution for θ.
Given a shock, θ has therefore, the following properties at the limit:
and lim
Equations (36) and (37) imply that in conditions of very high uncertainty, the CB will have to move its implicit target by a lot to counteract it. Under certainty of course, there is no need to deviate away from π * .Similarly for the E(θ). Substituting now (34) and (35) into (26) - (29) produces the same results as though we were operating under no uncertainty!
What this, in effect, shows is that by optimally varying the target (i.e. making an explicit target implicit) the uncertainty in the transmission process is neutralised. This result is a direct consequence of the way the inflation target becomes contingent on the shock occurring. Given the level of uncertainty, parameter θ is chosen to maximise the probability of hitting target π * . In the appendix we explain how the algorithm produces this result. What it shows intuitively, is that if the probability of the range of values that policy effects will take is maximised aroundā, then policy makers are better off -on average -applying the instrument as under conditions of Certainty Equivalence. We show next some numerical simulations which illustrate the mechanism that produces this result. Table 2 shows the results of 1000 stochastic simulations of our model under the two regimes of fixed and variable inflation targeting. Random shock ε is drawn from a N (0, 1) distribution, while parameter a is Moreover, in 98% of our realizations there is a welfare gain in following a variable inflation target. The reason can be seen from the table. As previously argued, what a variable inflation target does, is to reactivate monetary policy in a way that, given uncertainty, maximises the probability of hitting the target π * . Note that the average realisation of inflation is much closer to the target of 2 with a variable inflation target (in which the CB is not actually setting the policies to hit that target every time). Moreover, in using more the instrument, the variance of the targets is actually significantly reduced, thus providing also stabilisation gains.
Numerical Simulations
Our main conclusion is that the efficiency of fixed inflation targeting, like any other policy rule, is contingent on the particular system applied to. If monetary policy operates in an uncertain environment of the form described above, using a fixed inflation targeting rule can be inefficient, given the high probability of missing it. This occurs because under uncertainty, monetary policy becomes more cautious. Using the instrument less means that the objectives of the policy maker become less relevant in determining the performance of the system.
On the other hand, the policy authority can improve the performance of the system, bringing it towards the desired position if its target becomes contingent on the realisation of the shocks hitting the economy.
Thus, the policy problem of the bank is to determine the target value the the policy should follow, once the shock is known, such that the probability of hitting the target π * is maximised.
This appendix will give a theoretical argument for the reason why the variance disappears when you have an optimal choice of θ.
In the Brainard analysis, the optimisation of the objective function is E(L) = (π − π * ) 2 + σ 2 π implies that the instument is used less compared to the solution derived with certainty equivalence. The policy maker becomes therefore more cautious. This is due to the fact that the loss function is now composed of two terms, each a function of the first and second moments respectively. The first is thus the square deviation of the average policy from the target which is optimised for a the same value of i that optimises the loss function under certainty equivalence. The second term on the hand is a function of the variatiation of the policy instrument and is minimised when the instrument is not used at all (i.e i = 0). The optimal use of the instrument that minimises now both terms together depends on the coefficient of variation σ π π . And the relative importance of the two first moments will describe where precisely the optimal value will lie (Onatski 2000) .
A similar principle holds for the way that the private sector forms expectations. As already shown π e = a 2 a 2 +2σ 2 a π * which implies that for σ 2 a = 0 then the private sector will expect the bank to do whatever is needed to get to the target, i.e., π e = π * . If on the other hand σ 2 a = ∞, then the CB will not use the instrument at all and therefore inflation will be determined solely by the shock. Since the private sector can only anticipate an average value of zero for the shock, it will set its expectations equal to zero, i.e. π e = 0. For any positive variance, inflation expectations will be captured by the term above. Now lets turn to the variable inflation target case where the loss function is L = [π − (π * + θ)] 2 + σ 2 π + σ 2 θ + 2ρσ π σ θ where ρ is the correlation coefficient between π, θ.
Our optimisation procedure gives a value for θ that is a negative function of the (square of the) coefficient of variation
And the expected value of θ,(i.eθ or E(θ)), is equal to
Under uncertainty, as the variance increases then the relative significance of the second parameter increases such that the use of the instrument in optimal terms decreases. But a strategic choice of θ moves to redress the balance of significance of the two terms in the loss function as can been seen from 33.
This implies that as uncertainty increases, so will θ to eliminate. Optimally this eliminates the effect of
